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I. INTRODUCTION
The original policy for the implementation of payroll taxes was to
impose a tax on wages as both a funding mechanism for, and a limita-
tion to, qualifying for social security.  However, the self-employment
tax base developed severe inconsistencies with this original policy and
among different tax entities by including certain returns on capital
investments in the tax base.  At present, different payroll tax obliga-
tions arise for similarly situated taxpayers based solely on how busi-
ness owners elect to be taxed under the check-the-box regulations.
These inconsistencies resulted from misguided efforts by Congress
and the Treasury to view the payroll tax base with the same lens as
the income tax.  This misconception is evident in regulations and pro-
posals that seek to distinguish wages from capital for purposes of pay-
roll taxes based on the active/passive distinction that arose under the
passive loss limitation rules of the income tax.
Following the lead of the self-employment tax base, the newly
minted net investment income tax base that arose under the Afforda-
ble Care Act now suffers from similar inconsistencies.1  Consequently,
certain capital income for active members of tax partnerships is in-
cluded in the self-employment tax base, and this same income for
shareholders of S corporations is neither taxed as self-employment in-
come nor taxed under the net investment income tax regime.  Also,
owner–employees are entitled to significant reductions in their payroll
tax obligations when the value of their services provided to the com-
pany exceeds their share of the income from the company.  This reduc-
tion is never recaptured even if the company becomes very profitable
in subsequent years.  The net investment income tax takes effect for
the first time in 2013,2 and there are currently pending legislative
proposals that seek to merge the income tax provisions for the various
flow-through entities under one standardized set of rules.3  So the
time is ripe to eliminate the various inconsistencies in the payroll tax
and net investment income tax by using a uniform standard consist-
ently applied across all entities and taxpayers.
This Article makes four recommendations to restore the payroll tax
regime to its original purpose and cure these inconsistencies in the
payroll tax and net investment income tax bases.  First, payroll taxes
should be standardized for all taxpayers across all tax entities by us-
ing the reasonable compensation standard so that capital income is
entirely eliminated from the payroll tax base.  Second, the Treasury
1. Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
§ 1411, 124 Stat. 1029, 1061.
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., S Corporation Modernization Act of 2013, H.R. 892, 113th Cong. (2013);
Job Preservation and Economic Certainty Act of 2013, S. 277, 113th Cong. (2013);
Balancing Act, H.R. 505, 113th Cong. (2013).
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should issue additional significant regulations to improve the admin-
istration of the reasonable compensation standard, including provid-
ing safe harbor amounts that can be claimed as reasonable
compensation for the value of services provided by owner–employees
based on the average remuneration paid to similarly situated non-
owner taxpayers.  Third, to the extent that the owner–employee’s
share of income for the year is less than the value of services provided
to the company, such deficiency should be carried forward for up to
three future tax years and applied to increase the payroll tax base of
the owner–employee to the extent that the owner–employee’s share of
income exceeds the value of services provided in such later years.  Fi-
nally, the definition for net investment income for purposes of the net
investment income tax, a tax which is specifically meant to apply to
returns on capital, should be modified to simply include all items of
income that are not otherwise subject to the payroll tax base as wages.
Since the proper implementation of these recommendations would
require congressional action and the motivation for such changes is to
restore the payroll tax base to its original foundation rather than to
cut taxes or raise revenues, these changes should be made on as close
to a revenue-neutral basis as possible.  After taking the projected rev-
enue adjustments in the payroll and net investment income taxes
along with the projected adjustments to future outlays within the rele-
vant budget window, the tax rates could be adjusted downward to the
extent the changes increase net revenues or upward should these
changes result in a decrease in net revenues.  These changes would
reacquaint payroll taxes with the original policy for the social security
tax and benefit system—namely, that it be based on the wages of wage
earners rather than capital income—and would eliminate the arbi-
trary variance in the self-employment and net investment income tax
bases between identical business activities of owners of different flow-
through entities.
II. FICA AND SECA TAXES IN A NUTSHELL
The Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) imposes a tax on
both employees and employers on most wages paid to an employee
with respect to employment.4  Subject to a few limited exceptions,5 the
4. See I.R.C. § 3101 (2012) (setting Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
(OASDI) on wages for the employer and the employee, respectively, at 6.2% from
1990 forward for most wages except for wages subject to international agree-
ments); I.R.C. § 3121(a) (2012) (defining “wages” broadly as “all remuneration for
employment, including the cash value of all remuneration (including benefits)
paid in any medium other than cash,” subject to certain stated limitations).
5. I.R.C. § 3111(d) (2012) (noting a few limited exceptions where wages are not in-
cluded in the tax base for FICA including, by way of example, wages paid to stu-
dents by universities, certain wages paid to qualified veterans and a special
exemption for certain individuals hired in 2010 that was part of the Tax Relief,
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vast majority of wages paid to employees are subject to FICA tax, and
employers are required to deduct and withhold the employee’s FICA
tax obligation.6  Income paid to owner–employees in exchange for ser-
vices provided to the company are subject to self-employment tax pur-
suant to the Self Employment Contributions Act (SECA), although the
SECA tax base also includes certain types of capital income.7
The rate of tax on includible wages that applies both to the em-
ployer and the employee is 7.65%.  This is made up of a tax to support
old age, survivors, and disability insurance—the social security por-
tion—in the amount of 6.2%8 and hospital insurance—the Medicare
portion—in the amount of 1.45%.9  The social security portion applies
only to income below the wage base limit,10 which was $113,700 in
2013,11 while the Medicare portion applies to all qualified wages.12
So, collectively, the employer and employee in 2013 combine to pay
15.3% in FICA taxes due on the first $113,700 of income and 2.9% on
all wages thereafter, subject to an additional tax under the Affordable
Care Act on earnings exceeding a certain threshold.13  Notwithstand-
ing occasional rate changes,14 base increases,15 and temporary reduc-
tions,16 the overall scheme for FICA taxes has remained relatively
stable over the years since its initial enactment in the 1930s.
Under the Affordable Care Act there is an additional Medicare tax
of .9% on earnings in excess of $200,000 for unmarried taxpayers,
$250,000 for married filing jointly taxpayers, and $125,000 for mar-
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010); Pay-
roll Tax Cut to Boost Take-Home Pay for Most Workers; New Withholding Details
Now Available on IRS.gov, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Dec. 17, 2010) [hereinafter
Payroll Tax Cut], http://www.irs.gov/uac/Payroll-Tax-Cut-to-Boost-Take-Home-
Pay-for-Most-Workers%3B-New-Withholding-Details-Now-Available-on-IRS.gov.
6. I.R.C. § 3102(a) (2012).
7. See discussion infra section IV.A.
8. The “old-age, survivors and disability insurance” portion is commonly known as
either OASDI or the social security portion and will hereinafter be referred to by
the latter term.
9. See I.R.C. § 3111(a)–(b).
10. See I.R.C. § 3121(x).
11. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 15, (CIRCULAR E), EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE
1 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15.pdf.
12. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., UPDATE 2013 (2013), available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/
10003.html#a0=0.
13. See I.R.C. § 3101(b)(2) (2012); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-148, §§ 9015, 10906, 124 Stat. 119, 870, 1020 (2010).
14. I.R.C. § 3111(a).
15. Contribution and Benefit Base, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/oact/COLA/
cbb.html#Series (last visited Aug. 24, 2013) (displaying the increase in contribu-
tion and benefit bases from 1937–2013); see 42 U.S.C. § 430 (2006).
16. Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-96 § 1001,
126 Stat. 156, 158–59; Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization,
and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312 § 601(c), 124 Stat. 3296, 3309;
Payroll Tax Cut, supra note 5.
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ried filing separately taxpayers, bringing the tax on such earnings to
3.8%.17  There is also a corresponding tax of 3.8% on the lesser of an
individual’s unearned income or income in excess of these threshold
amounts, called the net investment income tax.18
Under SECA, self-employed individuals get the privilege of paying
both the employer and employee aspects of the FICA tax regime and,
as such, are taxed on wages at 15.3% up to the wage base limit.19
Wages in excess of this amount are taxed at 2.9% up to the threshold
income level activating the additional tax under the Affordable Care
Act where the tax then increases to 3.8%.20  However, one-half of the
SECA taxes paid are deductible as a business deduction on the indi-
vidual’s tax return.21  This was meant to ensure that the tax on self-
employed individuals was essentially the same as the combination of
payroll taxes paid by employed individuals and their employers with
the corresponding deduction for the employer.22  However, this effort
was not entirely successful because of variance in the FICA and SECA
tax bases across different flow-through entities, particularly in regard
to capital.23
17. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 9015, 10906; Healthcare and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1411, 124 Stat. 1029,
1061; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, Pub. No. 4168, THE TAXATION OF CAPITAL AND LA-
BOR THROUGH THE SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX 1 n.2 (2012) [hereinafter CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE], available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/at
tachments/09-27-SECA.pdf.
18. I.R.C. § 1411(a) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.1411-2 (2013).  It should be noted that this
is not an exhaustive list of the taxes and fees under the Affordable Care Act but is
limited to the taxes designed in the same mold as FICA and SECA taxes and
affected thereby.  Apart from the additional Medicare tax on wages and the tax
on net investment income, some of the better-known taxes under the Affordable
Care Act include: a new medical device tax under section 4191; a 40% tax on the
excess benefit of certain employer-sponsored plans, or so called Cadillac plans,
under section 4980I; an increase of the adjusted gross income floor for itemized
medical expense deductions from 7.5% to 10% under section 213; a tax on indoor
tanning services under section 5000B; and limitations of the deduction for com-
pensation paid by certain health insurance providers under section 162(m).  Also,
the individual mandate under section 5000A is itself a form of taxation pursuant
to Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion upholding the Affordable Care Act.
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594
(2012).
19. See I.R.C. § 1401(a)–(b) (2012) (setting self-employment OASDI at 12.40% start-
ing in 1990 and hospital insurance at 2.9% starting in 1986).
20. See I.R.C. § 1401(b)(2)(A); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 17.
21. I.R.C. § 164(f) (2012).
22. See Patricia E. Dilley, Breaking the Glass Slipper—Reflections on the Self-Em-
ployment Tax, 54 Tax Law. 65, 74–75 (2000).
23. See discussion infra section IV.C.
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III. THE POLICY FOR THE LAST GREAT “REGRESSIVE”
AND “FLAT” TAXES
If considering the tax burden alone, then the social security portion
of payroll taxes is arguably one of the few regressive tax regimes24
remaining in the United States and the hospital insurance is one of
the few remaining flat taxes.  However, taking both the direct benefits
and direct burdens of the payroll taxes into consideration reveals that
they are actually also progressive in nature.  As Nancy J. Altman ex-
plains, social security taxes are actually progressive because the bene-
fit formula was designed “to redistribute from those with higher
wages over their careers to those with lower wages.”25  When social
security is viewed as wage insurance where the benefits are tied to the
amount of wages subject to the tax rather than a benefit that is redis-
tributed among the population generally, then social security pay-
ments look a lot more like policy premiums or even contributions to a
retirement plan than “mere taxes.”26  Indeed, this position is perfectly
consistent with the way the payroll tax was viewed when originally
passed notwithstanding the subsequent decoupling of benefits and
burdens introduced when the Medicare portion was added.
A different view under the benefits principle may be that the re-
ceipt of benefits in proportion to the taxes paid is actually wholly con-
sistent with a progressive income tax or a progressive wealth tax
regime since the greater the income or wealth, the greater the benefit
derived from the public goods and services supported by income and
wealth taxes.  However, to the extent that the law of diminishing re-
turns applies to such benefits, then the benefits principal in the con-
text of a wealth tax would only support either a tax at a diminishing
marginal rate or, at most, a flat tax.27  Furthermore, absent a direct
24. Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax Poli-
cies, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 864 (1987); Willard Taylor, Payroll Taxes—Why
Should We Care? What Should Be Done?, 137 TAX NOTES 983 (2012).
25. Nancy J. Altman, The Striking Superiority of Social Security in the Provision of
Wage Insurance, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 109, 118–19 (2013).  Additionally, the
earned-income credit (“EIC”) may call into question the “flat” and “regressive”
nature of payroll taxes as the EIC provides a refundable credit of up to $5,891
that phases out with increasing income levels. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
2012 EARNED INCOME CREDIT TABLE 56–72 (2012), available at http://www.
irs.gov/pub/irs-dft/i1040tt—dft.pdf (providing that the EIC cancels out entirely
for single individuals with no children at $13,950 and $50,270 for married filers
with three or more qualified children).  While incorporating the EIC, an income
tax-based credit, into the payroll tax argument may admittedly be comparing ap-
ples to oranges, this distinction makes little difference from the taxpayers point
of view where the payroll taxes, SECA, and income taxes are all filed on the same
income tax return.
26. Altman, supra note 25, at 116.
27. Eric Rakowski, Can Wealth Taxes Be Justified?, 53 TAX L. REV. 263, 308 (2000)
(noting that the benefit principle may justify a wealth tax, but only if it were
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measurable benefit, the benefits approach may prove an entirely un-
workable framework for setting tax policy, as its pure implementation
in the wealth tax context could arguably lead to a head tax.28  But the
very reason why the application of the benefits principle may be un-
workable in the context of an income or wealth tax is why the benefits
principle is perfectly appropriate in the context of the payroll tax—
namely because a participant’s benefits are tied to the amount of
wages subject to payroll taxes and are also very easily quantified in
the form of future social security and Medicare benefits.
A. Legislative History Illustrates the Critical Differences
Between the Policy for Payroll Taxes and Income
Taxes
The original policy for the social security tax supports the view
that payroll taxes are really meant to approximate retirement and dis-
ability insurance policy premiums rather than serve as taxes, particu-
larly when contrasted with the original policy for the income tax.  The
history of the Social Security Act of 1935 bears this out, especially how
the program was viewed by its primary proponents, Franklin D.
Roosevelt (FDR) and Eleanor Roosevelt.  The idea for social security
originated with FDR’s pension plan enacted in New York while gover-
nor,29 but social security was seen as a significant improvement upon
this initial version.  In fact, Eleanor Roosevelt viewed the fact that the
New York pension plan relied upon annual appropriations as a key
weakness in the plan and proposed that a more robust plan would de-
pend on contributions made to the plan over the working life of each
participant.30  Indeed, FDR’s statement upon the passage of the Social
Security Act of 1935 focused on the idea that payments into social se-
applied at flat or diminishing marginal rates, which is inconsistent with current
wealth taxes).
28. See, e.g., Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX
L. REV. 423, 458 (2000) (asserting that the benefits principle is not a workable
approach for calculating indirect benefits received by all taxpayers and that, ig-
noring such limitations, applying the benefits principle would lead to the imposi-
tion of a head tax imposed on persons without regard to their ability to pay).
29. Our Documents: The Social Security Act, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT PRESIDENTIAL
LIBR. & MUSEUM, http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/odssa.html (last visited Aug.
22, 2013); see also Eleanor Roosevelt, Old Age Pensions: A Speech Before the D.C.
Branch of the American Association for Social Security, the Council of Social
Agencies, and the Monday Evening Club, ELEANOR ROOSEVELT PAPERS PROJECT
(Feb. 8, 1934), http://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/documents/articles/oldagepensions
.cfm (discussing the New York and Massachusetts pensions in effect at the time,
the Washington, D.C. legislation that was up for adoption, and her view that the
D.C. law would be a “model” and that “the eyes of the nation [would] be focused
on it”).
30. Roosevelt, supra note 29 (noting that a more robust system than the New York
and Massachusetts pensions, which required annual appropriations, would be for
the plan to “depend, when [it] becomes universal, on some method of insurance—
594 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:586
curity represented either payments for disability insurance or contri-
butions to a retirement plan.31
The concept of a trust fund holding the contributions to social se-
curity, in stark contrast to the taxation and appropriation regime, was
a critical element to insulate social security from the variance inher-
ent in the business cycle,32 as well as the political whims of the day.33
In fact, one of the reasons social security contributions and participa-
tion were based on wages was to give participants a “legal and moral
right” to collect what FDR referred to as the social security “pen-
sion.”34  According to Flemming v. Nestor, this right to social security
benefits is not actually a legal right,35 but it remains a substantial
perceived and political right for many lay people who commonly take
issue with the technical characterization of social security as an enti-
tlement,36 a position which has garnered sympathy from at least one
sophisticated legal commentator.37  FDR’s vision proved prophetic as,
even now, nearly eighty years later, the rights to social security bene-
fits are deemed so sufficiently certain from a political perspective that
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) as a matter of course includes
the outlays and deficiencies in the social security trust funds in its
some fund which is paid into over a whole period of a person’s life, or earning life
at least”)
31. Franklin Roosevelt’s Statement on Signing the Social Security Act, FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM (Aug. 14, 1935), http://
docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/odssast.html (referring to the retirement aspects of
the act as “old-age pensions” and the act as a whole as an insurance).
32. Id. (stating that the structure of the social security act would lessen “the force of
possible future depressions” and protect future administrations from “going
deeply into debt to furnish relief to the needy”).
33. Patricia E. Dilley, Through the Doughnut Hole: Reimagining the Social Security
Contribution and Benefit Base Limit, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 367, 387 n.63 (2010) (cit-
ing Senator Moynihan’s account of a meeting with President Roosevelt wherein
FDR stated that payroll tax contributions were meant to “give the contributors a
legal, moral, and political right to collect their pension and their unemployment
benefits” so that “[n]o damned politician can ever scrap my Social Security
Program”).
34. Id.
35. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960) (holding that recipients have no
actual contractual right to social security benefits based on payments).
36. See, e.g., Peter Breskovich, Letter to the Editor, Social Security Not an ‘entitle-
ment,’ STANDARD-EXAMINER, Mar. 4, 2013, http://www.standard.net/stories/2013/
03/04/social-security-not-entitlement; Katie Glueck, AARP’s Barry Rand: Mend,
Don’t End Entitlements, POLITICO (Jan. 15, 2013, 12:16 PM), http://www.politico.
com/story/2013/01/aarp-mend-dont-end-entitlements-86217.html.
37. Brendan S. Maher, The Benefits of Opt-in Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1733, 1749
n.80 (2011) (citing Paul M. Secunda, Constitutional Contracts Clause Challenges
in Public Pension Litigation, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 263 (2011)) (noting
that, while social security is technically an entitlement for federal budgeting pur-
poses, “one view may be that an entitlement is an unconditional moral right;
under that definition, Social Security is not an entitlement, because it has
conditions”).
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calculations and future projections of the federal deficit.38  Addition-
ally, as various other federal programs have been carried lifeless off
the battlefield of budget cuts, scaled back by sequesters, or deemed
non-essential during government shutdowns, the social security pro-
gram has exhibited enormous staying power by surviving such recent
fights mostly unscathed.
Given the initial structure and policy for social security, the contri-
butions to social security were appropriately viewed as a hybrid of dis-
ability insurance and unemployment insurance payments, as well as
contributions to a retirement plan, rather than as a tax.39  The justifi-
cation for the regressive nature of payroll taxes was, in fact, that they
were never meant to be viewed as taxes at all.  The benefits of social
security were directly tied to the individuals who paid into the system,
and participation was only extended to the wage earners rather than
investors of capital.40  Participation in social security was viewed as a
good deal for the participants because they were expected to receive
significantly more in benefits on a net present value basis than they
contributed to the program,41 which held true for more than fifty
years from 1935 through at least 1985.42  This is why Congress sought
to prevent individuals who did not need social security from partici-
pating in the program.43  In fact, in 1951 when the then 1.5% payroll
tax was expanded to include a 2.5% tax on self-employed individuals,
it was done primarily so that these individuals could participate in the
benefits of the social security program—not as a source of additional
revenue.44
In stark contrast to payroll taxes, there is no moral or political cor-
relation between paying income taxes and the receipt of any nonpublic
specific benefit.  Income taxes are deemed an appropriate duty inci-
dent to the benefits of participating in income-earning opportunities
in the United States that are available to society in general.  This un-
derlying policy for the income tax was articulated prior to the passage
38. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2013
TO 2023, at 15 (2013), available at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
attachments/43907-BudgetOutlook.pdf.
39. See Dilley, supra note 33, at 385–87.
40. Dilley, supra note 22, at 70–71.
41. Dilley, supra note 33, at 287 (citing REPORT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, H.R.
DOC. NO. 76-110, at 5 (1939), available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/
38ssbadvise.html) (“[E]very worker, regardless of his level of earnings or of the
length of time during which he has contributed, will receive more by way of pro-
tection than he could have purchased elsewhere at a cost equal to his own
contributions.”).
42. Stephen Ohlemacher, Is Social Security Still a Good Deal for Workers?, YAHOO!
NEWS (Aug. 5, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/social-security-still-good-deal-work-
ers-125016929—finance.html.
43. Dilley, supra note 22, at 74.
44. Id.
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of the Sixteenth Amendment,45 and it provides a stark contrast to the
policy for the payroll tax in terms of the linkage between its benefits
and burdens, namely, that there is no such linkage.  In the Supreme
Court’s watershed, and greatly maligned, ruling in Pollock v. Farmers’
Loan & Trust Company, the then-existing income tax on interest, divi-
dends, and rents was deemed unconstitutional as an unapportioned
direct tax in violation of Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.46
The U.S. Constitution originally contemplated taxes in three catego-
ries—only the second of which was free from the requirement to be
apportioned to the several states based on population—(i) direct taxes,
(ii) duties, imposts, and excises, and (iii) the capitation tax.47  Con-
gress responded directly, albeit belatedly,48 to Pollock with the pas-
sage of the Sixteenth Amendment, eliminating the apportionment
requirement as to direct taxes.
President Taft addressed the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives on June 16, 1909, with a special message recommending passage
of the Sixteenth Amendment to Congress.49  In Taft’s inaugural ad-
dress in 1909, he had stated that new forms of taxation were needed to
address the rapidly increasing deficit, including a possible graduated
inheritance tax, particularly if the then-proposed tariff bill secured in-
adequate revenues.50  Since it was evident by that summer that the
Senate would not support the inheritance tax, Taft proposed a general
income tax in the form and character previously struck down in Pol-
lock, but he did so this time via a constitutional amendment to avoid a
fate similar to the prior income tax law.51  Having lifted the appor-
tionment requirement as to Congress’s power “to collect taxes on in-
comes, from whatever source derived,”52 the Sixteenth Amendment
granted plenary power, or significantly unlimited power, to the federal
45. It should be noted the Sixteenth Amendment was merely the re-birth of the in-
come tax, which had passed in 1894 as a basis for the decision in Pollock v. Farm-
ers’ Loan & Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429 (1895) aff’d, 158 U.S. 601 (1895), and
also existed during the Civil War. See Ellen Terrell, History of the US Income
Tax, Business Reference Services, LIBR. CONGRESS (Feb. 2004), http://www.loc.gov/
rr/business/hottopic/irs_history.html.
46. Pollock, 157 U.S. 429 (1895), aff’d, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
47. Edward B. Whitney, The Income Tax and the Constitution, 20 HARV. L. REV. 280,
280 (1905) (internal quotations omitted).
48. It took more than fourteen years from the Pollock decision to enact the Sixteenth
Amendment in 1909, and the Amendment wasn’t ratified by the states until
1913. U.S. GOV’T. PRINTING OFFICE, AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 33 n.8, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
GPO-CONAN-1992/pdf/GPO-CONAN-1992-7.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2013).
49. 45 CONG. REC. 3344–45 (1909)
50. Id.; President William Howard Taft, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1909).
51. Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning
of “Incomes,” 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1108 (2001).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
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government over the use of funds derived from the income tax.53  So
the income tax was implemented to raise funds to cover the general
expenses of the federal government that contribute to the deficit in
whatever form these expenses may take.54
In summary, the underlying policies for payroll taxes and income
taxes are completely different.  There was a clear intention that the
use of funds from the income tax be entirely decoupled from the source
of those funds.  It was never intended that taxpayers would receive
specific benefits based on whether they paid income taxes or on their
amount of income subject to tax.  The payroll taxes, on the other hand,
were initially levied for the specific purpose of providing social secur-
ity directly to the contributors and in amounts that were based di-
rectly on the amount of wages included in the payroll tax base.  As
such, this author rejects the argument that the social security portion
of the payroll tax is an improper regressive tax indistinguishable from
the income tax as well as the related assertion that payroll taxes
should simply be collapsed into the income tax base in order to correct
this perceived flaw.55  To the contrary, the social security portion of
the payroll tax is more appropriately viewed as a retirement and disa-
bility insurance premium and not as a tax at all.  The original policy
for the payroll tax, including its originally intended structure, remains
highly relevant today—both as a safeguard for the benefits granted
thereunder and as a proper metric for assessing the merit of any pro-
posed changes to the payroll tax system.
B. The Subsequent Decoupling of the Payroll Tax Benefits
and Burdens Through the Passage of Medicare Changed
the Character and Perception of Payroll Taxes to More
Closely Approximate the Income Tax Regime Than Was
Originally Intended
When Medicare was initially passed in 1965,56 the program used
the payroll tax base as a tax on wages but assessed tax on all wages
53. Jensen, supra note 51, at 1058.
54. Furthermore, it is generally agreed that the Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution “does not significantly constrain how taxable income can be defined
by Congress and the courts.” Id. at 1059 (quoting Daniel N. Shaviro, Psychic
Income Revisited: Response to Professors Johnson and Dodge, 45 TAX L. REV. 707,
711 n.17 (1990)); Ruth Mason, Federalism and the Taxing Power, 99 CAL. L. REV.
975, 995 (2011) (noting that modern decisions may tentatively support the posi-
tion that the Taxing and Spending Clause to the U.S. Constitution “would allow
Congress to use its taxing power, like its spending power, to regulate areas that it
may not regulate directly.”).
55. See Taylor, supra note 24, at 983.
56. Dean M. Harris, Beyond Beneficiaries: Using the Medicare Program to Accom-
plish Broader Public Goals, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1251, 1287 (2003).
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rather than just wages up to the wage base limit.57  The initial .35%
Medicare Hospital Insurance was implemented for both employed and
self-employed taxpayers.58  Medicare benefits generally flow equally
to all citizens or permanent residents of the United States who are
sixty-five years or older and who worked for at least forty quarters, or
ten years, in Medicare-covered employment.59  Unlike the social se-
curity benefit, which is based on the level of wages subject to social
security tax, Medicare benefits are provided equally to individuals and
spouses meeting the forty-quarter requirement without any regard to
the level of wages that were subject to the payroll tax.  Therefore, the
Medicare portion of payroll taxes significantly—although not en-
tirely—decoupled the benefit for burden quid-pro-quo that exists for
the social security portion of the tax.  This decoupling pushed the
functional nature of payroll taxes in the direction of income taxes lev-
ied to fund a general benefit for society, as opposed to contributions for
a defined benefit or insurance premiums.  The Medicare portion of the
payroll tax better supports the position that the payroll tax is merely a
flat tax on income that manages to hang on as a function of low sali-
ence.  But even though Medicare is a flat tax based on wages, the ben-
efits are progressive because low wage earners receive the same
benefits as high wage earners.  Additionally, the functional nature of
the Medicare portion places it somewhere in between the policy for the
social security tax and the policy for the income tax.  This is because
eligibility for Medicare is still premised on a degree of participation,
however slight, in bearing the burden for the program based on the
forty-quarter requirement, but the connection between the benefits
and burdens is significantly less direct than for the social security
portion.
IV. THE SECA AND FICA TAX BASES VARY FOR SELF-
EMPLOYED INDIVIDUALS OWNING DIFFERENT ENTITY
TYPES AND EMPLOYEES AND FAILS TO COMPLY WITH THE
ORIGINAL POLICY FOR THE PAYROLL TAX REGIME
A. The SECA Tax Base Includes Capital Income
There is a different tax base under SECA than FICA because, in
addition to taxing the wages of the business owner, SECA also taxes
capital in certain circumstances.60  Congress’s apparent intent was for
the SECA tax base to precisely mirror the FICA tax base to extend
social security and Medicare benefits to self-employed individuals
57. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1817, 79 Stat. 286, 299.
58. Id. §§ 1401, 3101.
59. Carsten A. Peterson, New Twist to an Old Injustice—Genetic Discrimination and
Medicare Reform, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 345, 355 n.81 (2000).
60. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 17, at 1–3.
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through the taxation of “remuneration from one’s own labor.”61  How-
ever, the way the tax base was actually defined by Congress included,
potentially inadvertently, income from capital from unincorporated
businesses.
The SECA base is based on the self-employed individual’s distribu-
tive share of net income from a trade or business carried on as a part-
nership or guaranteed payments to a limited partner performing
services for the partnership.62  The definition does specifically exclude
several important capital income items including rent income from
real and personal property; dividends from stocks and bond interest;
gains and losses from capital assets, timber, and mining; and certain
involuntary conversions of capital assets,63 but other forms of capital
income are included in the base.  The 2012 CBO report on the taxation
of labor and capital through the SECA Tax described this as follows:
Specifically, the SECA tax base can include the return on investments in tan-
gible and intangible (but not financial) assets made by an unincorporated bus-
iness.  In contrast, if an incorporated business makes the same investment,
the return is reflected in the company’s profits, not in its employees’ wages,
and therefore is not included in the FICA tax base.64
The taxation of capital arises from returns on investments in ex-
cess of the reasonable wages of the owners of noncorporate entities on
non-excluded capital income items such as intangible assets like intel-
lectual property, goodwill, or business processes.  However, the appli-
cation of these returns on investment to the SECA tax base is
inconsistent even among noncorporate flow-through entities.65
Certainly when income from self-employment was first subjected
to SECA tax in 1951,66 the concept of capital investment in intangible
assets and goodwill was not as relevant as is the case today.  This tax-
ation of capital in unincorporated businesses may have been an acci-
dent of history resulting from either poor drafting or an
understandable lack of foresight, but the combination of this imperfect
definition with the drastic expansion of limited liability companies
(LLCs) and capital investment in intangible property has greatly exac-
erbated what would have otherwise been a fairly minor inconsistency
between the FICA and SECA tax bases.  In fact, the capital portion is
now estimated by the CBO at 42% of the total SECA Hospital Insur-
ance (HI) tax base.67
61. Dilley, supra note 22, at 74.
62. See I.R.C. § 1402(a) (2012).  In fact, Professor Patricia Dilley explains the imple-
mentation of SECA as stretching FICA tax “beyond all recognition in the quite
different context of self employment.”  Dilley, supra note 22, at 65.
63. I.R.C. § 1402(a)(1)–(3).
64. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 17, at 2.
65. See discussion infra section IV.B.
66. Dilley, supra note 22, at 74.
67. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 17, at VI.
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B. SECA Tax on Capital Is Inconsistently Applied to Owners
of LLPs, LLCs, and S Corporations
The SECA tax base was intended to tax only wages, but the
formula that was originally established to approximate wages of busi-
ness owners failed to exclude all capital from taxation for unincorpo-
rated entities and also does not tax limited partners on their capital
investments.68  As a result, the SECA tax base varies depending on
the form of flow-through entity the owner elects to utilize for the busi-
ness operations.  There may be no distinction between the actual eco-
nomics of a shareholder run S corporation and a member-managed
LLC, apart from a check-the-box tax election,69 but there are very sig-
nificant differences in how the capital invested in tangible and intan-
gible assets is taxed under the self-employment payroll tax regime.
The most favorable entity in many instances for purposes of reducing
payroll tax liability is the S corporation because all earnings above
and beyond the value of the services provided by the owner to the cor-
poration, as determined by a reasonable compensation standard, are
excluded from the payroll tax base for that owner.70  Remuneration in
excess of the reasonable compensation amount is a “distribution of
profits,”71 or a dividend that is excluded from the SECA tax base
under section 1402 of the Internal Revenue Code,72 meaning that in-
come from investments in tangible and intangible property is not in-
cluded in the SECA tax base for S corporation shareholders.  It should
be noted that the word “dividend” in the payroll tax context is used in
a completely different manner than for income tax purposes.73  Such
dividends for S corporations are more appropriately described as dis-
tributions from profits in excess of reasonable compensation74 and are
68. Id. at 1–2.
69. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2006).
70. Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: The Small Business Love-Hate Relation-
ship with Corporate Tax, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 26, 2011, available at LEXIS,
2011 TNT 186-1.
71. See I.R.C. § 1402 (2012).
72. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-5(a) (1963); see, e.g., Richard Winchester, Working for
Free: It Ought to Be Against the (Tax) Law, 76 MISS. L.J. 227 (2006) (asserting
that there is a “substantial economic incentive” for high-income em-
ployee–shareholders to work for free, thereby substituting SECA-free dividends
for the compensation that would have otherwise been subject to SECA taxes).
73. See Mark S. Hoose, Trading One Danger for Another: Creating U.S. Tax Resi-
dency While Fleeing Violence at Home, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 827, 833 n.30 (2012)
(explaining briefly the differences for income taxation of dividends for corpora-
tions as opposed to the distribution of profits for S corporations).
74. See Radtke v. U.S., 895 F.2d 1196, 1197 (7th Cir. 1990) (re-characterizing “divi-
dends” from an S corporation providing professional services as wages or reason-
able compensation); Rev. Rul. 74–44, 1974–1 C.B. 287 (referring to distributions
of corporate profits of an S corporation as “dividends” but determining that such
“dividends” were in fact reasonable compensation and, therefore, subject to SECA
taxes).
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not taxed as dividends for income tax purposes like dividends from
corporations taxed under Subchapter C.75
Owners of limited liability partnerships (LLPs) are taxed under
SECA in a completely different manner.  LLPs were once taxed in the
same manner as other tax partnerships, but in the 1970s Congress
became concerned that wealthy individuals close to retirement were
joining LLPs as limited partners in order to qualify for social security
benefits.76  Such participation by limited partners was deemed to be
“inconsistent with the basic principle of social security—to partially
replace lost earnings from work,” and in response, “Congress amended
Code Sec. 1402(a) in 1977 to exclude a limited partner’s share of part-
nership income (other than for guaranteed payments received for ser-
vices actually rendered). . . .”77  As such, section 1402(a)(13) of the
Internal Revenue Code provides that limited partners do not owe any
payroll taxes on their respective “distributive share[s] of any item of
income.”  This is consistent with the historical requirements that a
limited partner be a passive investor and not be actively involved in
the day-to-day operations of the business because such an investor
would not earn wages in the traditional sense.78
All income received by a limited partner, other than remuneration
for services and guaranteed payments, is clearly passive income de-
rived from that partner’s capital investment in the LLP and, there-
fore, is excludible from the SECA tax base.79  So limited partners are
75. However, technically an S corporation can have a dividend taxed under the in-
come tax similar to a dividend from a C corporation to the extent of remaining
earnings and profits that accumulated in the corporation prior to its S election.
See I.R.C. § 1368(c)(2) (2012).
76. Timothy R. Koski, The Application of Self-Employment Tax to Limited Liability
Companies: A Critical Analysis, 23 J. APPLIED BUS. RES., no. 3, 2007, at 87.  It is
worth noting that this provides direct evidence that a significant number of indi-
viduals were actually seeking to increase their participation in the social security
program by structuring their affairs in such a manner as to maximize their pay-
roll tax liability, further demonstrating why the payroll tax is an altogether dif-
ferent animal than the income tax.
77. Id. at 87–88.
78. It is generally inadvisable for nontax reasons in an LLP for a limited partner to
provide services or engage in any degree of management because too much activ-
ity in an LLP by an inactive partner may result in the limited partner being
treated like a general partner and, therefore, subjected to unlimited liability. See
Mitchell A. Stephens, A Trap for the Rational: Simultaneous Removal and Ap-
pointment of a General Partner Under the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership
Act, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 521, 523 (2007) (noting the general principle under the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1916 that, in contrast to general partners,
limited partners could “not incur personal liability beyond the amount of their
partnership contributions,” but to garner this protection, limited partners also
must not take “an active role in the management of the partnership”).
79. See, e.g., Orly Sulami, Good News in a Bad Economy: Service Acquiesces on Pro-
Taxpayer Application of Passive Activity Loss Rules to Limited Liability Compa-
nies, 65 TAX LAW. 81, 102–03 (2011) (noting that a potential downside to recent
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essentially subject to the same rules as S corporation shareholders,
but general partners of LLPs, who are not subject to the limitation
under section 1402, are taxed in the same manner as partners in other
tax partnerships, such as active members of LLCs.
General partners of LLPs, sole proprietors, partners, and owners of
other entities taxed as partnerships, including LLCs, are governed by
a completely different set of rules for determining the payroll tax base.
Since LLCs and partnerships receive income in the form of distribu-
tive shares rather than receiving dividends like corporations, the dis-
tributive share of income is not specifically excluded under section
1402(a).80  So partnerships rely on the general exclusions of certain
passive income items under section 1402(a)(1)–(3), which is an incom-
plete list of capital income exclusions designed to avoid taxing all capi-
tal but failing to exclude income from capital invested in tangible and
intangible assets.
The theories take completely different approaches as S corpora-
tions start with reasonable compensation and then assume that all
other income is from the owner’s capital investment in the company.
The theory for LLCs and general partners is to assume all income is
from wages and then exclude specific items that are generally derived
from the owner’s capital investment but fail to exclude all such items.
Therefore, members of LLCs and general partners include more in-
come in their SECA tax base than similarly situated shareholders of S
corporations. Notwithstanding this difference, there may be signifi-
cant income-tax advantages to selecting the partnership tax regime
depending on the specific circumstances of the business arrange-
ment.81  Individuals who simply earn wages through an employer and
decisions treating LLC members as general partners for purposes of the passive
activity loss rules is that the treatment “will likely increase an LLC member’s
[SECA] tax liability when the LLC is profitable”).
80. This approach assumes all income from an LLC that is not excluded under sec-
tion 1402(a) of the Internal Revenue Code is subject to SECA tax, consistent with
the CBO projections, but some practitioners may take the position that an inac-
tive member of an LLC should be taxed the same as an inactive member of an
LLP based on Proposed Treasury Regulations section 1.1402(a)-2(g)–(h), 62 Fed.
Reg. 1702, 1704 (Jan. 13, 1997), which was never made final. See discussion in-
fra section III.D.
81. Lest this negative view of LLCs from a payroll tax perspective should inaccu-
rately lead one to believe that LLCs and other tax partnerships are disfavored by
the tax code, there are other potentially more important factors that might lead a
business arrangement to be structured as a tax partnership, including, but not
limited to, the very flexible provisions for special allocations of items of income
and loss pursuant to section 704(a) of the Internal Revenue Code that are gener-
ally upheld so long as the allocation has substantial economic effect.  Treas. Reg.
§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(i)–(iii) as amended in 2013; see LAURA E. CUNNINGHAM & NOE¨L B.
CUNNINGHAM, THE LOGIC OF SUBCHAPTER K: A CONCEPTUAL GUIDE TO THE TAXA-
TION OF PARTNERSHIPS 44–74 (West 4th ed. 2011).  The ability to do special alloca-
tions is one of the reasons LLCs remain the entity of choice among start-up
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then earn capital income from investments in corporate entities, re-
gardless of whether those entities are closely held or publicly traded,
are not taxed under FICA on any of the income from their capital in-
vestments.  To the extent that the incidence of both the employee and
employer side of the FICA tax is actually borne by the employee,82 the
only difference between the FICA tax base and the SECA tax base is
this taxation of capital.  Because owners of S corporations are not
taxed on such capital, the S corporation regime for determining the
SECA tax base most closely approximates the payroll tax base appli-
cable to the general wage-earning population under FICA.
C. Illustrating the Inconsistencies
If a picture is worth a thousand words, then a simple example may
be helpful to illustrate how owners of different tax entities and non-
owners are treated so differently.  In this example, there are two own-
ers of a business: “A” the affluent and inactive investor and “B” who
works full time in the business.  The business has no income from the
types of capital described in § 1402(a), meaning that all capital income
is associated with the company’s goodwill (such as business processes,
branding, client lists, know-how, etc.).  Comparing this same business
based on whether it is taxed as an LLC, an LLP, or an S corporation
illustrates the significant variance in the SECA tax liability of owners
A and B.
1. SECA Tax Base for S Corporation, LLC, and LLP Modeled
In the first two examples, the business has $1.2M in revenues and
$900,000 of expenses for a gross profit margin, excluding any compen-
sation to B, of $300,000, which is split 50–50 both for tax purposes and
for purposes of distributions between the two owners.83  We will as-
sume that an employee in the same industry with B’s skill and experi-
ence makes a salary of $75,000:
companies notwithstanding the payroll tax advantages of S corporations. See,
e.g., Jerald David August, Benefits and Burdens of Subchapter S in a Check-The-
Box World, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 287, 298–99 (1999) (noting that the one-class-of-stock
requirement for S corporations precludes creating distribution and liquidation
preferences, as well as special allocations of tax items).
82. See Deborah A. Geier, Incremental Versus Fundamental Tax Reform and the Top
of One Percent, 56 SMU L. REV. 99, 104 (“[E]conomists generally agree that the
economic incidence of both the employer and employee portions of the payroll
taxes is borne by the employee.”).
83. The 50–50 allocation could vary by agreement of the parties under the special
allocation rules for entities taxed as partnerships pursuant to section 704(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code so long as the allocation has substantial economic
effect. See sources cited supra note 81.
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Table 1: Comparison of SECA Tax Liability Among Flow-Through Entities
LLC LLP S Corporation
Owner A B Total A B Total A B Total
Income $150,000 $150,000 $300,000 $150,000 $150,000 $300,000 $150,000 $150,000 $300,000
Dividends * $ - $ - $ - $150,000 $ - $150,000 $150,000 $ 75,000 $225,000
SECA Base $113,700 $113,700 $227,400 $ - $113,700 $113,700 $ - $ 75,000 $ 75,000
12.4% Rate 12.4% 12.4% $ 0 12.4% 12.4% $ 0 12.4% 12.4% $ 0
SECA Tax $ 14,099 $ 14,099 $ 28,198 $ - $ 14,099 $ 14,099 $ - $ 9,300 $ 9,300
HI Base $150,000 $150,000 $300,000 $ - $150,000 $150,000 $ - $ 75,000 $ 75,000
HI 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9%
HI Tax $ 4,350 $ 4,350 $ 8,700 $ - $ 4,350 $ 4,350 $ - $ 2,175 $ 2,175
Total $ 18,449 $ 18,449 $ 36,898 $ - $ 18,449 $ 18,449 $ - $ 11,475 $ 11,475SECA Tax
* The example is focused solely on the payroll tax consequences and, as such, it drastically oversimplifies the
“Dividends” line item, which in reality would represent any number of things from a distributive share of profits of a
tax partnership, to dividends from an S corporation, or dividends from a C corporation. Each of these items would
have drastically different consequences for purposes of income taxes, but the payroll tax bases are generally
unconcerned with such distinctions.
Based solely on the payroll tax effects, A would clearly disfavor the
LLC form where A’s payroll tax liability would be $18,449, and B
would have a strong preference for being organized as an S corpora-
tion where B’s SECA tax liability would be just $11,475.  Thus, the
self-employment tax effects would favor organization as an S corpora-
tion for this business.84  These decisions are certainly not made in iso-
lation, and so other critical factors, including the different income tax
treatment of other items and concerns over limitations on liability,
would also play an important role.  For instance, LLPs are generally
disfavored because of personal liability exposure to general partners.
Depending on the form of the business activities, if the two most im-
portant factors are limiting payroll tax liability and personal liability,
then the S corporation represents the best of both worlds for both own-
ers in this simple case.
84. A recent study indicated that shareholders of S corporations face the highest ef-
fective tax rates of all entity types, but as the study points out, this result was
driven by an increase in the highest marginal tax rates for individuals and the
fact that S corporation shareholders both reported the most income from other
sources and reported business income levels that were much higher than the in-
come reported by other pass-through entities. See QUANTRIA STRATEGIES, LLC,
ENTITY CHOICE AND EFFECTIVE TAX RATES 20-21 (2013), available at http://
waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/quan-
tria_study_etr_8613_final_pm_embargoed.pdf.  While the study has been mis-
quoted to support the assertion that S corporations are disfavored under the tax
law because of a higher average effective tax rate, the higher rates paid by S
corporation shareholders are really an indication that wealthier taxpayers tend
to prefer this entity type, particularly where income from the business represents
only a portion of a taxpayer’s total income, which is wholly consistent with the
findings in this example.
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2. Comparing Treatment of Owners and Employees Under
SECA and FICA
Next we consider the distinction between owners and non-own-
ers—non-owners meaning individuals who own interests in companies
other than the company that pays their wages.  Assuming that B, the
employee, earns $75,000 before taking into account both the employer
and employee portions of the FICA tax in wages85 and $75,000 in divi-
dends from capital investments in publicly traded companies.86  For
purposes of the non-owners, A will be an investor who makes $150,000
in dividends from capital investment in this same publicly traded
company.
Table 2: Comparison of SECA & FICA Tax Liability Between Flow-Throughs & Non-Owner Sources
Wages & Publicly TradedLLC LLP S Corporation Capital
Owner Total Total A B Total A B Total
Income $300,000 $300,000 $150,000 $150,000 $300,000 $112,500 $187,500 $300,000Allocation
Dividends $ - $150,000 $150,000 $ 75,000 $225,000 $125,000 $ 75,000 $200,000
SECA Base $227,400 $113,700 $ - $ 75,000 $ 75,000 $ - $ 75,000 $ 75,000
Tax Rate
12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 12.4%
Tax $ 28,198 $ 14,099 $ - $ 9,300 $ 9,300 $ - $ 9,300 $ 9,300
HI Base $300,000 $150,000 $ - $ 75,000 $ 75,000 $ - $ 75,000 $ 75,000
HI 3.8% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9%
HI Tax $ 8,700 $ 4,350 $ - $ 2,175 $ 2,175 $ - $ 2,175 $ 2,175
Total SECA $ 36,898 $ 18,449 $ - $ 11,475 $ 11,475 $ - $ 11,475 $ 11,475Tax
* Amounts are based on the totals for both taxpayers A and B as reflected in Table 1.
Based on this hypothetical, it is clear that the payroll tax paid
under the S corporation form using the reasonable compensation stan-
dard is the closest approximation to the FICA tax that would other-
wise apply in a non-owner context.  In fact, the amount paid is exactly
the same so long as the allocable earnings of the business exceed the
reasonable compensation or value of the owner–employee’s services.
85. Comparing SECA and FICA is always somewhat problematic because of the em-
ployer portion of the FICA tax, but, for purposes of simplicity and without engag-
ing in the incidence debate, the model implies that the economic incidence of both
portions of the tax is borne by the employee.
86. There are several obvious limitations to this model in practice, but it has been
deliberately oversimplified to show the effect across different entities holding all
things equal.  For instance, in order for the assumptions about the effect of the
employee’s wages on the investor’s income allocation to hold true, the publicly
traded corporation would have to pay an equivalent amount of wages to all of its
employees on a per-revenue basis as the smaller corporation, ignoring economies
of scale.
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So members of LLCs are shouldering a disproportionately high burden
of both the SECA tax load and the overall payroll tax load through the
taxation of their capital investment that similarly situated owners of
S corporations and wage earners with other capital investments are
not subject to.  It is odd that the payroll tax system has been crafted in
a manner that creates a perverse incentive to keep wage earnings and
income from capital separate.  It is difficult to justify this disparate
treatment, which is almost certainly an unintended consequence.
3. The Benefits of Ownership Under SECA Tax Where the Value
of Services Provided Exceeds the Income from the Entity
Notwithstanding the above arguments, which apply to the extent
that B earns more income from the business than the value of B’s rea-
sonable compensation, this only tells half of the story.  If the em-
ployee–owner’s portion of the income from the business is less than
the value of services that the employee–owner provides to the com-
pany, then there are actually significant benefits to being an owner as
opposed to a similarly situated non-owner.  To the extent that the
owner’s labor income or the value of the services the owner provides to
the business exceeds the owner’s distributive share of net income from
the business, the owner’s SECA tax liability is based on that lesser
amount rather than the actual value of the services provided by the
owner.  Income that would otherwise be taxed in two separate pieces,
one part as positive income from wages and one part as an unrealized
capital loss in the form of a reduction in value of the business’s good-
will, is combined and netted out.  The following chart illustrates this
issue:
Table 3: Comparison of SECA Tax Liability Across Various Entities
Wages & Publicly TradedLLC * LLP * S Corporation Capital
A B Total A B Total A B Total A B Total
Income $25,000 $25,000 $50,000 $25,000 $25,000 $50,000 $25,000 $25,000 $50,000 $(12,500) $62,500 $50,000Allocation
Gain/Loss $ - $ - $ - $25,000 $ - $25,000 $25,000 $ - $25,000 $(12,500) $(12,500) $(25,000)
SECA $25,000 $25,000 $50,000 $ - $25,000 $25,000 $ - $25,000 $25,000 $ - $75,000 $75,000Base
Tax Rate 12.4% 12.4% $ 0 12.4% 12.4% $ 0 12.4% 12.4% $ 0 12.4% 12.4% $ 012.4%
Tax $ 3,100 $ 3,100 $ 6,200 $ - $ 3,100 $ 3,100 $ - $ 3,100 $ 3,100 $ - $ 9,300 $ 9,300
HI Base $25,000 $25,000 $50,000 $ - $25,000 $25,000 $ - $25,000 $25,000 $ - $75,000 $75,000
HI 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9%
HI Tax $ 725 $ 725 $ 1,450 $ - $ 725 $ 725 $ - $ 725 $ 725 $ - $ 2,175 $ 2,175
Total
SECA $ 3,825 $ 3,825 $ 7,650 $ - $ 3,825 $ 3,825 $ - $ 3,825 $ 3,825 $ - $11,475 $11,475
Tax
The significantly higher FICA taxes paid by B as a wage-earning
employee are the result of B earning $75,000 in wages, notwithstand-
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ing the $12,500 in losses from the corporation.  This indicates that
owner–employees receive a significant SECA tax benefit compared to
their wage-earning and separately investing counterparts when faced
with negative income from capital that would otherwise be included in
the SECA tax base.  The CBO estimated that in 2004 this offset re-
sulted in a 56% reduction in the SECA tax base compared to the
amount that would be included if the owner–employee’s SECA base
was determined under the reasonable compensation standard applica-
ble to corporations under the FICA tax regime.87
At first glance, this policy seems appropriate as it would create a
negative incentive against owning one’s own business if the SECA tax
base for self-employed individuals were set to the value of the reasona-
ble compensation for services provided to their business without re-
gard to whether the owner-employee had any actual income from the
company.  This justification falls flat, however, to the extent that the
business generates income well in excess of the value of the services
the employee–owner provides to the company in later years.  The em-
ployee–owner’s efforts in prior years when the company has insuffi-
cient income to include the value of these services in the SECA tax
base may result in significant income in later years, but the reduction
in the SECA tax base from the prior years is never recaptured.
D. The Tax on Net Investment Income Enters the Fray,
Adding Another Layer of Complexity on Top of an
Already Incoherent Payroll Tax Regime
Pursuant to section 1411 of the Internal Reveue Code, starting in
2013 there is a 3.8% tax imposed on “net investment income” in excess
of the applicable modified adjusted gross income amount, which is
$250,000 for joint filers, $125,000 for married filing separately filers,
and $200,000 for most other taxpayers.88  There is a parallel tax appli-
cable to wage income under both FICA and SECA that is meant to
ensure that all income in excess of these same thresholds is subject to
a 3.8% tax, regardless of whether the income is from investment or
wages.89  The definition of net investment income is quite similar, pre-
sumably intentionally, to the types of income excluded from SECA tax
under section 1401.90  Similar to section 1401, the definition of net
investment income is an incomplete list of capital income items that
87. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 17, at 10–11. But see Glass Blocks Unlimited
v. Comm’r, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 657 (2013) (holding that distributions to the tax-
payer were wages subject to FICA and not a repayment of loans even though such
wages exceeded the taxable income attributable to the taxpayer from his wholly
owned S corporation).
88. See I.R.C. § 1411(b) (2012).
89. See I.R.C. §§ 3101(b)(2) & 1401(b)(2)(A) (2012).
90. Compare I.R.C. § 1411(c), with I.R.C. § 1401.
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fails to include income from capital invested in tangible and intangible
assets.91  Not surprisingly, practitioners have already expressed con-
fusion as to how the new law should be interpreted and what types of
income this law applies to, particularly in the flow-through entity con-
text,92 and the Department of the Treasury has issued proposed regu-
lations to provide guidance in interpreting the new law.93
The net investment income tax was not meant to cover income that
is subject to self-employment tax, and in fact, there is a specific exclu-
sion for any income item taxed under the self-employment regime en-
suring that such income is not subject to both the 3.8% net investment
income tax and the 3.8% SECA or FICA tax.94  However, the net in-
vestment income tax does not capture all income that is excluded from
SECA tax.  One critical and glaring omission is that net investment
income excludes operating income from nonpassive business activi-
ties.95  Whether such income is derived from a nonpassive activity is
determined at the taxpayer level based on the general material partic-
ipation principles of the passive loss limitation rules under section
469.96  Combining this significant net investment income tax gap with
the SECA tax regime applicable to S corporations means that nonpas-
sive business income allocable to shareholders of S corporations in ex-
cess of the value of their reasonable compensation would be subject to
neither SECA taxes nor the net investment income tax.97  Applying
the passive loss limitation rules in this manner does allow the net in-
91. See I.R.C. § 1411(c).
92. See Donald B. Susswein, McGladry LLP, Statement at Public Hearing on Pro-
posed Regulations to Implement the Net Investment Income Tax Under the In-
ternal Revenue Code Section 1411 (Apr. 2, 2013) (noting that although “[a]t first
blush, the idea of extending the existing health insurance tax and personal ser-
vice income . . . to investment income seems quite straightforward, . . . [i]n prac-
tice, however, it is a quite difficult matter to get it working correctly”); Kim
Dixon, U.S. IRS Weighs Changes to Obama Healthcare Investment Tax Rules,
REUTERS (Apr. 2, 2013, 6:05 EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/02/
usa-tax-healthcare-investment-idUSL2N0CP1I020130402.
93. See Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1411-1 to -10, 77 Fed. Reg. 72612, 72634–52 (Dec. 5,
2012).
94. See I.R.C. § 1411(c)(6).
95. See I.R.C. § 1411(c)(1)(A)(ii) & (c)(2)(A) (specifically including gross income from a
trade or business only to the extent that it is derived from passive activities).
96. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1411-5(b) (2013).
97. See Steven B. Gorin, Lisa M. Rico, & Amber K. Quintal, Get Ready for the 3.8%
Tax on Net Investment Income, 27 PROB. & PROP., July–Aug. 2013, at 30 (noting
that wealthy individuals who may have previously preferred passive income to
offset passive losses may “benefit from transforming passive income into nonpas-
sive income by grouping activities together to satisfy the material participation
tests, as long as this can be done without dis-allowing passive losses or subjecting
the income to self-employment tax.”); PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PLANNING FOR
THE NET INVESTMENT INCOME TAX, ALSO KNOWN AS THE MEDICARE CONTRIBUTION
TAX 3 (2012), available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/private-company-services/
publications/assets/pwc-pfs-planning-update-net-investment-tax.pdf.
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vestment income tax to capture certain income from limited partners
and inactive members of LLCs that may generally otherwise be ex-
cluded from the SECA tax base, but the omission of nonpassive income
from the net investment income tax base exacerbates the disparity be-
tween owners of S corporations and all other similarly situated tax-
payers without any substantive policy justification.
Practitioners have also expressed concerns over whether income
from trusts and certain rental activities should be included in the net
investment income tax base, and so there appears to be some confu-
sion as to what may be legally excluded.98  There is merit to such con-
fusion.  Under section 1411(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, the
3.8% tax is imposed on the lesser of the undistributed net investment
income of an estate or trust or the adjusted gross income of the estate
or trust that is taxed at the highest tax bracket, noting that the high-
est tax bracket applicable to trusts kicks in at just $11,950 in income
in 2013.99  But the determination of whether income from an estate or
trust is nonpassive is an unsettled area of the law that is fraught with
peril.100  Section 469 was not written in contemplation of the activities
of trusts and estates and, further, the regulation section reserved for
specifically applying the passive activity rules in the context of trusts
and estates has not yet been written.101  So the further application of
section 469 to determining the net investment income tax for trusts
presents additional unnecessary and unwelcomed complexity.  Addi-
tionally, as discussed later,102 using the distinction between passive
and active income derived from the passive loss limitation rules fails
as a proxy for distinguishing between wages and capital income.
V. STANDARDIZING THE PAYROLL TAX TREATMENT
FOR ALL TAXPAYERS
As a preliminary matter, before discussing the different ap-
proaches for standardizing the SECA tax base across all entities, it is
worth considering whether such a result is desirable.  The lack of con-
sistency between the SECA tax bases for different tax entities is not
necessarily a problem as long as there is a legitimate reason for the
distinctions, but as discussed above,103 the variance in the SECA tax
bases between different flow-through entities results from either an
98. Dixon, supra note 92.
99. See I.R.C. § 1(e) (2012); Rev. Proc. 2013-15, 2013-5 I.R.B. Table 5.
100. Compare Mattie K. Carter Trust v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 2d 536 (N.D. Tex.
2003) (deciding material participation based on both the activities of the trustee
and the individuals conducting the business of the trust), with I.R.S. Tech. Adv.
Mem. 200733023 (Aug. 17, 2007) (deciding material participation based only on
the activities of the fiduciary).
101. See Treas. Reg. § 1.469-8 (1992).
102. See discussion infra section V.B.
103. See discussion supra section III.B.
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accident of history or policies that are no longer applicable or relevant.
As such, these inconsistencies create additional administration and
complexity for the taxpayers, as well as tax-planning opportunities,
without any corresponding benefit.  Commentators uniformly agree
the current regime stands in need of repair and have proposed various
solutions.104  Indeed, while this author proposes a very specific solu-
tion to this variance in the SECA tax base across flow-through enti-
ties, any movement toward standardization using any of these
methods would likely be an improvement over the current regime in
terms of the ease of administration and clarity.
A. Why a Standardized Payroll Tax System May Be
Politically Feasible
The House Ways and Means Committee is considering options for
reforming the income tax of small businesses and flow-through enti-
ties and has circulated a discussion draft of some of the currently pro-
posed provisions.105  The discussion draft contains two options with
the first option consisting of a number of changes within the current S
corporation/partnership dichotomy and the second a far more drastic
option that essentially uproots Subchapter K and Subchapter S and
supplements these sections with a unified Subchapter K covering all
flow-through entities.106  The first option consists of a series of compa-
rably minor changes to Subchapter K and Subchapter S consistent
with several proposed changes previously advanced by Congress and
scholars alike107 that would represent a more modest, albeit signifi-
cant, move toward uniformity of income taxation for flow-through en-
104. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 17; SECTION OF TAXATION, AM. BAR
ASS’N, TAX RULES GOVERNING SELF-EMPLOYMENT INCOME OF LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES AND PARTNERSHIPS (2002), available at www.americanbar.org/content
/dam/aba/migrated/tax/pubpolicy/2002/020529c.authcheckdam.pdf; Altman,
supra note 25, at 167; Dilley supra note 33, at 376–77; Thomas E. Fritz, Flow-
through Entities and the Self-Employment Tax: Is It Time for a Uniform Stan-
dard?, 17 Va. Tax Rev. 811, 870–71 (1998); Michael E. Mares, Am. Inst. of
Certified Pub. Accountants, Legislative Proposal Regarding Tax on Self-Employ-
ment Income Under Section 1402 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Feb. 27, 1998, available at LEXIS, 98 TNT 39-34.
105. See generally HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 113TH CONG., WAYS AND
MEANS DISCUSSION DRAFT TO AMEND THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986 TO
PROVIDE FOR COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAX REFORM (2013).
106. See Willard B. Taylor, Subchapter S Out the Window? What’s Going On?, 139 TAX
NOTES 1051 (2013).
107. Compare id., with S Corporation Modernization Act of 2013, H.R. 892, 113th
Cong. (2013), S Corporation Modernization Act of 2011, H.R. 1478, 112th Cong.
(2011), SECTION OF TAXATION, AM. BAR ASS’N, OPTIONS FOR TAX REFORM IN SUB-
CHAPTER S OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 1 (2013), STAFF OF JOIN COMM. ON
TAXATION, JCS-6-97, REVIEW OF SELECTED ENTITY CLASSIFICATION AND PARTNER-
SHIP TAX ISSUES (1997), and William B. Brannan, The Subchapter K Reform Act
of 1997, 75 TAX NOTES 121 (1997).
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tities.108  Option two would throw out Subchapter S entirely and
combine all flow-through entities under a standardized subchapter
K.109
While these two options vary drastically in terms of the scope of
the proposed changes to current law, either option would represent a
significant step toward standardizing the income taxation of flow-
through entities.  Neither option currently takes any position as to
which standard would be applied to determine the SECA tax base.110
But even if the far less ambitious first option were adopted into law, it
would demonstrate a clear congressional intent to simplify the tax
code as to flow-through entities.  Moreover, the passage of that law
would suggest that such a simplification is a politically feasible prior-
ity.  An accompanying simplification and unification of the SECA tax
regime would be consistent with congressional intent to simplify the
tax code as to flow-through entities.  It would be far more difficult to
imagine the adoption of the second option without a corresponding
provision unifying the SECA tax111 both based on the logic that Con-
gress would certainly not want to unify the income tax and retain a
completely decoupled SECA tax regime and because, as a practical
matter, many of the current SECA tax provisions rely on the underly-
ing Code sections that would be amended or deleted if such an option
were adopted.  So there clearly appears to be some degree of motiva-
tion on the hill to both simplify and unify the taxation of flow-through
entities from both sides of the political aisle and, based on that back-
drop, the focus now turns to which proposal might most effectively ac-
complish these goals.
B. The Three Standardizing Approaches Previously
Proposed by the Congressional Budget Office
The CBO analyzed three different approaches for defining the
SECA tax base as an alternative to the current model that would ei-
ther clarify the proper tax base across entities or include less capital
income.112  These models include: (i) the material participation stan-
dard, (ii) the reasonable compensation standard, and (iii) the safe har-
bor calculation of capital income.113  The material participation
standard would standardize the SECA tax treatment across different
types of partnerships while the reasonable compensation standard
and the safe harbor calculation of capital income would standardize
108. See Taylor, supra note 106.
109. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 105.
110. Id.
111. Although it is equally difficult to imagine any such sweeping tax legislation pass-
ing in the first place given the current climate in Washington, D.C. .
112. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 17, at 18.
113. Id. at 18–23.
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the SECA treatment across all types of entities by eliminating capital
from the SECA tax base.114
The material participation standard takes a page out of the passive
loss limitation rules—where material participation is generally based
on whether the owner engages in the operation of the business for
more than 500 hours (lower thresholds apply if the owner is the pri-
mary or only participant in the company)115—and then imposes SECA
tax on all income of material participants, presumably subject to the
current exclusions of passive items.116  This would impose SECA tax
on the income of limited partners in LLPs that are currently exempt
from SECA tax liability if they are active participants under the pas-
sive loss limitation rules.  On the other hand, the income of participat-
ing members of an LLC that fall short of material participation would
no longer be subject to SECA tax.117
The material participation standards are an odd fit for the SECA
tax base, as they were never intended to approximate wages.  The pas-
sive loss limitation rules were adopted to prevent taxpayers from us-
ing non-economic tax shelter losses to offset their positive sources of
income, which constitute the major part of the federal income tax
base.118  These rules use an inefficient and complicated, yet highly ef-
fective, standard to decipher between economic and non-economic
losses necessitated by the significant abusive tax shelters, which need
to be quelled in a sweeping practical manner.119  There can be little
argument that certain legitimate economic losses cannot be taken
under these rules.  Likewise, applying the rules as a proxy for wages
would eliminate items that clearly are wages from the SECA tax base
and would continue to include in the base other income items that
clearly are not.  Additionally, this method is completely inconsistent
with FICA taxes, which assess a tax on the first dollar earned and the
first hour worked, without regard to the number of hours worked by
the employee.120  For these reasons, a material participation standard
is a poor metric for calculating wages for the SECA tax base.
114. Id.
115. This is an intentionally gross oversimplification of the passive loss limitation
rules under I.R.C. section 469.  For a far more complete description of the passive
loss limitation rules, see the relevant section 469 regulations.
116. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 17, at 19.
117. This is a position that undoubtedly is already being adopted by some such LLC
member taxpayers based on the Temporary Regulation § 1.1402(a)-2, even
though that regulation has never been made final.
118. Robert J. Peroni, A Policy Critique of the Section 469 Passive Loss Rules, 62 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1988).
119. The “practical” nature of the passive loss rules applies to the taxing authority,
not the taxpayer, because the sheer complexity of the rules for taxpayers seeking
to be excepted from the general rules ensures that most taxpayers simply will not
bother attempting to take such losses.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 4–6.
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The next approach discussed by the CBO is the reasonable-com-
pensation standard.121  This standard already applies to S corpora-
tions and C corporations, which are required to report the reasonable
compensation earned by shareholders,122 and so this approach would
merely extend the currently existing law for corporations to tax part-
nerships.  The concept of reasonable compensation is well established
under section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code and the supporting
regulations.123  The test for reasonable compensation is generally an
objective test of simply assessing the value of the services provided
under the circumstances.  “It is, in general, just to assume that rea-
sonable and true compensation is only such amount as would ordina-
rily be paid for like services by like enterprises under like
circumstances.”124  Inasmuch as the policy for payroll taxes is to as-
sess a tax on wages and provide a direct benefit to wage earners, using
the reasonable compensation standard across all entity types is
clearly the most consistent approach to the original policy for the
SECA and FICA tax regimes.125
While there can be little question that this approach is the closest
to the original policy for FICA and SECA taxes, the reasonable com-
pensation approach has been greatly criticized because of practical
concerns over its administration.126  The concept of determining rea-
sonable compensation originated with Subchapter C corporations,
where the IRS sought to prevent corporate shareholder-employees in
closely held corporations from avoiding double taxation by paying
themselves wages in excess of their reasonable compensation.  This
was a problem because amounts that really represented a return on
capital in the form of corporate profits that would otherwise be subject
to double taxation127 if paid in the form of wages to an em-
ployee–shareholder could be deducted at the corporate level128 and
121. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 17, at 21.
122. Id.
123. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (2012).
124. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(3) (1960).
125. This is consistent with the exclusionary approach proposed by Thomas Fritz
where all income from flow-through entities is deemed income from capital except
for the income related to services performed. See Fritz, supra note 104 (asserting
that the reasonable compensation approach “is the most logical and direct means
of identifying and valuing the specific income” for a SECA tax base and that the
legitimate potential administrative complexities “should be managed rather than
regarded as absolute obstacles to implementing an approach that otherwise is
proper”).
126. Robert R. Keatinge, COMPENSATION ISSUES IN LLCS AND OTHER PASS-THROUGH
ENTITIES 323 n.372 (2012).
127. Meaning these amounts would be taxed at the corporate level and then taxed
again as a dividend at the shareholder level.
128. A business may take an ordinary and necessary business expense deduction for
“a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services
actually rendered.” See I.R.C. § 162(a)(1).
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taxed only once at the shareholder level as compensation.129  Thus,
the standard was developed initially in a manner that only sought to
prevent wages from being overreported.  Courts apply a multifactor
test to determine whether the compensation is reasonable including:
the employee’s qualifications; the nature, extent and scope of the employee’s
work; the size and complexities of the business; a comparison of salaries paid
with the gross income and the net income; the prevailing general economic
conditions; comparison of salaries with distributions to stockholders; the pre-
vailing rates of compensation for comparable positions in comparable con-
cerns; the salary policy of the taxpayer as to all employees; and in the case of
small corporations with a limited number of officers the amount of compensa-
tion paid to the particular employee in previous years.130
So the determination is heavily factual and, given the number of
factors that affect this determination, it is particularly difficult to ad-
minister.  Additionally, the standard is not meant to determine the
actual value of the services provided, but rather, is meant to deter-
mine the outside fringe where a reasonable amount of compensation
becomes unreasonable with the burden of proof on the taxpayer.131
When the standard was turned on its head in the application of
determining whether wages taken by a Subchapter S corporation
shareholder were unreasonably low for purposes of determining SECA
taxes, it is not surprising that the results have been less than ideal.132
The tax strategy has been referred to, somewhat unfairly, as the John
Edwards Tax Shelter, based on former presidential and vice presiden-
tial candidate John Edwards’s use of an S corporation to exclude mil-
lions of dollars of income derived from his law practice from payroll
taxes in the 1990s and, more recently, the Gingrich Tax Strategy,
based on a similar use and result for Newt Gingrich’s consulting
firm.133
129. John C. Ramirez, Best Practices: Reasonable Compensation Analysis for C Corpo-
rations and S Corporations, INSIGHTS, Spring 2012, at 46–47, available at http://
www.willamette.com/insights_journal/12/spring_2012_8.pdf.
130. Charles Schneider & Co. v. Comm’r., 500 F.2d 148, 152 (8th Cir. 1974) (quoting
Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 115, 119 (6th Cir. 1949)).
131. B.B. Rider Corp. v. Comm’r., 725 F.2d 945, 952 (3d Cir. 1984).
132. Spicer Accounting, Inc. v. United States, 918 F.2d 90, 93 (9th Cir. 1990) (reas-
signing income taken as a dividend as wages under the reasonable compensation
standard); Radtke v. United States, 895 F.2d 1196, 1197 (7th Cir. 1990) (re-char-
acterizing dividends as wages); Scott E. Vincent, 8th Circuit Finds Accounting S
Corporation Paid Unreasonably Low Wages, 68 J. MO. B. 114, 114–15 (2012) (not-
ing that the IRS may impose employment taxes on the reclassified dividend pay-
ments using the minimum reasonable compensation standard); Sean McAlary
Ltd. v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2013-62 (Aug. 12, 2013) (finding that only
$83,200 of more than $200,000 in income was appropriately deemed wages,
which substantially exceeded the $24,000 the taxpayer originally claimed).
133. See Paul Sullivan, The Advantages and Risks of Gingrich’s Tax Strategy, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/04/your-money/advantages
-and-risks-of-gingrichs-s-corporation.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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In David E. Watson, P.C. v. United States, a partner in an account-
ing firm held a 25% interest in his wholly owned S corporation.134
The S corporation received distributions in excess of $200,000 each
year from the accounting firm, but the accountant took a mere $24,000
salary from the S corporation and deemed the remainder to be nonsa-
lary distributions.135  The court, based on the expert testimony of the
IRS, determined that Mr. Watson’s reasonable compensation under
the circumstances was $91,044.136  This was a pyrrhic victory for the
IRS given that the case required an expert’s testimony as well as an
appeal to the Eighth Circuit in order to attain a judgment of just more
than $10,000 per year137 before penalties and interest and the result-
ing increase in payroll taxes will have the result of increasing Mr.
Watson’s social security benefits upon retirement.
Additionally, Mr. Watson was still successful in excluding more
than half of his income from a professional services company, one in
which he was a partner, that may have otherwise been included in his
SECA base by assigning his interest in the accounting firm to his
wholly owned S corporation and applying the more favorable S corpo-
ration SECA tax rules.  If the same standard were applied to S corpo-
rations as to any other entity, then this maneuver would not have
reduced Mr. Watson’s tax liability.
Watson demonstrates that, even though the reasonable compensa-
tion standard is clearly the best standard in light of the original policy
for payroll taxes and social security, the standard is in need of further
guidance from both Congress and the IRS if it is to be the principal
vehicle for determining a taxpayer’s SECA tax liability.  A rule that
requires expert testimony when so little tax is in controversy is not
administrable, and safe harbor rules providing more specific guidance
on the amounts of reasonable compensation taxpayers should claim
would be a welcomed addition to the regulatory framework.138  In-
deed, “shareholder/employees of S corporations have an incentive to
treat corporate payments to shareholders as something other than
compensation for services rendered” in order to minimize payroll
134. 757 F. Supp. 2d 877 (S.D. Iowa 2010), aff’d, 668 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir. 2012).
135. Watson, 668 F.3d at 1018.
136. Id.
137. The IRS increased Mr. Watson’s SECA tax base by $67,044 from $24,000 to
$91,044, which would have resulted in an increased payroll tax liability of
$10,258 for each year calculated at 15.3%, resulting in the total liability of
$23,431.23 to Mr. Watson, including applicable penalties and interest. See id. at
1013.
138. Fritz, supra note 104 (supporting the reasonable compensation approach for de-
termining the SECA tax base but asserting that Congress should, in the legisla-
tive history, clearly establish a preference for “the facts-and-circumstances
approach to [defining reasonable compensation], with the greatest emphasis to be
given to factors that focus directly on measuring the value of services rendered”).
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taxes,139 so it is evident the reasonable compensation standard pro-
vides far more opportunities for abuse than the more formulaic LLC
and LLP standards.  In summary, while the reasonable compensation
standard most closely approximates the original policy for determin-
ing the proper FICA and SECA tax bases, it stands in need of repair
before it can be reliably applied across all flow-through entities to de-
termine the SECA tax base.
The next approach addressed by the CBO is the safe harbor calcu-
lation of capital income approach proposed by the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants in 1997 for partners providing more
than 100 hours of services to the company.140  This is basically the
opposite approach to the reasonable compensation standard as it
seeks to determine what percentage of income is derived from capital
and considers the remaining income to be wages.141  However, since it
is difficult to determine the income derived from capital, the approach
uses a safe harbor by summing up the total capital investment and
applying a rate of return equal to 150% of the maximum applicable
federal rate.142  This approach deliberately favors purchased intangi-
ble assets over self-made intangible assets like goodwill, as income
from a self-made intangible asset would be considered wages.
Outside this somewhat arbitrary safe harbor, it may be difficult to
determine the income from capital.  In this context, a preliminary
question should be whether it is easier to determine the income de-
rived from a capital investment as opposed to the value of services
provided.  In theory, either approach should provide the same result,
but in practice, it is generally much easier to determine the value of
services provided because there is direct evidence in the form of non-
owner employees providing similar services, both within and without
the company, which can be used as a metric for determining the value
of the services provided by the owner–employee.  The safe harbor cal-
culation of capital income method is inconsistent with the policy be-
hind the FICA and SECA tax, as it would inappropriately tax self-
made capital as wages while purchased capital would be entitled to
the benefits of the safe harbor and, outside the safe harbor, the admin-
istration of this approach is more difficult than the reasonable com-
139. Herbert v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2012-124, 3 (Dec. 26, 2012) (nonprecedential
pursuant to I.R.C. § 7463(b) (2012)) (upholding IRS’s increased determination of
wage amount based on the reasonable compensation standard).
140. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) approach actu-
ally doubled down on the participation standards by including only guaranteed
payments for partners contributing less than 100 hours of services but including
guaranteed payments and the partners’ proportional share of business income
less an amount representing capital income based on the safe harbor calculation
of capital income.  Mares, supra note 104.
141. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 17, at 23.
142. Id.
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pensation approach.  The safe harbor calculation of capital income
approach should therefore not be used to determine the SECA tax
base.  However, the concept of a safe harbor could be effectively imple-
mented into the reasonable compensation approach to ease the admin-
istrative burden of determining the SECA tax base.
The tax section of the American Bar Association (ABA) proposed a
hybrid approach in 2002 that would “give partners the choice of ex-
cluding from the SECA tax base either their income in excess of rea-
sonable compensation or the safe-harbor amount of capital income
described by the [American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA)].”143  This hybrid approach would entail the same pros and
cons as the other approaches it replicates, but it would be very
favorable to taxpayers because it would allow taxpayers to elect
whichever approach minimizes or maximizes their SECA tax base, de-
pending on whether they were seeking to reduce payroll tax or in-
crease participation in social security.  While favorable to taxpayers,
the ABA proposal should not be implemented, as it does little to sim-
plify an already overly complicated area of the tax law and is inconsis-
tent with the underlying policy for FICA and SECA for the same
reasons as the safe harbor calculation of capital income approach,
which the ABA proposal partially implements.
C. Another Approach for Standardization Is to Apply the
SECA Tax Base for Tax Partnerships to Limited Partners
in LLPs and Shareholders of S Corporations, but This
Approach Is Also Inconsistent with the Policy for Payroll
Taxes
One alternative for normalizing the SECA tax base would be to
apply the law for LLCs to both LLPs and S corporations.  Thus far, it
has been taken for granted that the definition of capital income is a
simple one, namely, a return on capital investment.  But capital in-
come might be viewed as really constituting three different elements:
the real risk-free rate of return, the risk premium, and the infra-mar-
ginal return.144  In most cases, capital income consists of the first two
elements, but in limited circumstances, it represents the infra-margi-
nal return,145 which is a return on “ideas, managerial skill, or market
power” and represents “a return to a combination of labor, that is, a
143. Id. at 34; see also SECTION OF TAXATION, AM. BAR ASS’N, TAX RULES GOVERNING
SELF-EMPLOYMENT INCOME OF LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES AND PARTNERSHIPS
(2002), available at www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/tax/pubpol
icy/2002/020529c.authcheckdam.pdf (listing the recommended changes contained
in the 2002 proposal and explaining the principles underlying those changes).
144. Noe¨l B. Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital Income and the Choice of Tax Base,
52 TAX L. REV. 17, 23 (1996).
145. Id.
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person’s ideas or skills, and capital.”146  The concept of the infra-mar-
ginal return is interesting when used to analyze the SECA tax base
because it represents returns on capital that look a whole lot more like
wages than the risk-free rate of return and the risk premium.  Indeed,
this mixing of capital and labor, which is particularly problematic
where the company is creating its own intangible property, is part of
why the reasonable compensation standard is so difficult to adminis-
ter.  So there is a legitimate argument that the infra-marginal return
on capital should be part of the SECA tax base because taxing this
return is consistent with the policy that the FICA tax base should in-
clude labor.
While the infra-marginal return analysis provides an important
theoretical justification for a more expansive payroll tax base than a
mere tax on wages or reasonable compensation, it is not consistent
with the SECA tax base for entities taxed as partnerships where the
tax on capital is based on taxing tangible and intangible property and,
as a practical matter, it may be impossible to administer.147  However,
if the value of the services portion of this return is adequately ac-
counted for through the reasonable compensation standard, then the
remaining synergistic value of the “idea” would be appropriately at-
tributable to capital under the reasonable compensation standard.
For instance, the infra-marginal returns from publicly traded compa-
nies are never included in the FICA tax base, so deeming these re-
turns to be capital in nature, except to the extent of the services
portion, would be consistent with the FICA tax portion of such re-
turns.  Thus, while using the infra-marginal return might be a legiti-
mate justification for expanding the SECA and FICA tax bases beyond
the mere taxation of wages, doing so would require changes to the pay-
roll tax base for all taxpayers if such a method were to be consistent
across the board.  Additionally, it should be noted that simply ex-
panding the SECA base currently applicable to tax partnerships to
both S corporations and LLPs also does not accomplish this goal.
Applying the LLC standard to other flow-through entities might
make sense based on the benefits and burdens analysis.  The limita-
tions on social security participation were enacted because participa-
tion in social security was viewed as a significant benefit that should
be limited to wage earners rather than merely as a tax burden.148
However, because the average social security tax now far outweighs
the anticipated benefit, the policy arguably no longer supports limit-
ing participation to wages because the direct burdens already exceed
the direct benefits—deteriorating the distinction between the social
security tax and the income tax.  Under this analysis, applying the
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See supra notes 39–44 and accompanying text.
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law for tax partnerships to all flow-through entities would be appro-
priate, and doing so would, without question, raise significant tax rev-
enues.  But taking this approach would also represent a further
abandonment of the original purpose of the payroll tax program and
would disfavor owner–employees by significantly increasing the gap
between the FICA and SECA tax bases.  This would be a deliberate
move in the direction of the policy for an income tax.  Therefore, a
more appropriate solution would be to restore the social security pro-
gram to its original intended purpose as a tax and benefit for wage
earners rather than expanding the tax base—and the related bene-
fits—to new sources of capital income.
D. The IRS’s Noble but Futile Attempt to Standardize the
SECA Tax Base Between LLCs and LLPs
Interestingly, the IRS attempted to implement regulations that
would have granted the same tax treatment enjoyed by limited part-
ners in LLPs to certain inactive members of LLCs, but Congress pre-
vented the IRS from making the proposed regulations final.  In 1997,
the IRS issued proposed Treasury regulation section 1.1402(a)-2,
which exempted inactive members of an LLC from SECA on distribu-
tions,149 thereby closing the gap as to SECA taxes between LLCs and
LLPs for certain members.  This was actually a revision to the IRS’s
1994 attempt,150 which treated an LLC member as a limited partner
if the member did not have authority to participate in management
and the member could have qualified as a limited partner under the
law of the relevant jurisdiction.151
The 1997 proposed regulations treated an LLC member the same
way as a limited partner in an LLP, meaning the member’s income
would not be included in the SECA tax base, unless:
(i) the member had personal liability for LLC debts, (ii) the member
had authority to contractually bind the LLC under state law, (iii) the
member participated in management for more than 500 hours during
the taxable year, or (iv) substantially all of the activities of the LLC
involve certain professional services and the member provided profes-
sional services on behalf of the LLC.152  Such professional services in-
clude services in the fields of health, law, engineering, architecture,
accounting, actuarial science, or consulting.153  While this standard is
similar to the standard applicable to limited partners, this would have
expanded the tax base as to limited partners contributing more than
500 hours of labor, but given the limitations on limited partners en-
149. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(g)–(h), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702, 1704 (Jan. 13, 1997).
150. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-18(c)(3), 59 Fed. Reg. 67253 (Dec. 29, 1994).
151. See Koski, supra note 76, at 88.
152. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(g)–(h), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702, 1704 (Jan. 13, 1997).
153. Id. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(6)(iii).
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gaging the business, such contributions of labor would typically be the
exception to the rule.
Since limited partners are taxed in a similar manner to sharehold-
ers in S corporations, this proposed regulation would have cured the
inequity between partnerships and S corporations as to SECA taxes
on dividends and distributions for individuals who were wholly inac-
tive in the business, but this would not have benefited active members
in LLCs and LLPs.  Also, while the regulation represents a step in the
right direction in terms of consistency across different entities, it suf-
fers from the same issues as the CBO proposal because it is tied to an
arbitrary distinction derived from the passive loss limitation rules.
The IRS appears to want to return to the 1970s policy of excluding
passive income as a proxy for capital income even though this is
wholly inconsistent with the administration of FICA taxes.  Regard-
less, proposed Treasury regulation section 1.1402(a)-2 was never
made final because Congress issued a moratorium preventing the
Treasury from making this regulation final as part of the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997.154  Following the brief period of the moratorium,
the IRS never issued a final regulation, and the law as to inactive
members of an LLC remains unclear.  Therefore, the counterintuitive
and arbitrary differences between the SECA tax burdens of different
owners depending on what type of flow-through entity they elect to
become (or fail to elect to become) have survived through to the pre-
sent day.
VI. UTILIZING A MODIFIED VERSION OF THE REASONABLE
COMPENSATION STANDARD TO REMEDY THE
INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE BASES FOR SECA TAX,
FICA TAX, AND THE NET INVESTMENT INCOME TAX
The reasonable compensation standard is the best standard for de-
termining the proper SECA tax base because (i) it is the most consis-
tent approach to the original intent of FICA and SECA taxes—that
they be a tax on wages and not capital—(ii) it provides the most con-
sistent results across the FICA and SECA tax bases, and (iii) it does
not include any income from capital.  The problems with applying the
reasonable compensation standard to all taxpayers are that doing so
may significantly reduce the SECA tax base without an equivalent
corresponding reduction in the benefits paid out under social security
and that it is administratively difficult to implement.  In the past this
author favored a simpler-is-better approach to drafting legislation
154. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 935, 111 Stat. 788, 882 (“No
temporary or final regulation with respect to the definition of a limited partner
under section 1402(a)(13) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 may be issued or
made effective before July 1, 1998.”).
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and, consistent with that approach, this Part tackles some ways that
the current application of the reasonable compensation standard could
be simplified, improved, and universally applied across all flow-
through entities.
A. The SECA Tax Base Should Include Only the Value of
Services the Owner–Employee Provides to the Entity
The difficulty in applying the reasonable compensation standard is
largely a self-inflicted wound.  The IRS has sufficient data based on
the huge number of employee–taxpayers that it can easily calculate
the value of reasonable compensation for various types of services an
employee–owner may provide to a company.  Since the value of ser-
vices paid to employees is generally an arms-length transaction be-
tween unrelated parties, this value is the most effective way of
determining the appropriate level of reasonable compensation for an
owner–employee providing the same services.  A safe harbor salary
amount could be provided for nearly every type of service by simply
publishing in regulations the average salary for such services based
on a number of factors including the employee’s geographical region,
job title, function, qualifications, years of experience, and other deter-
mining factors.  If the IRS published these safe harbor averages, then
employee–owners and the IRS could rely on them without the expense
of costly expert witnesses during litigation, and the only issue would
be whether the employee–owner’s self-reported description of the ser-
vices he or she provides is accurate and complete.  If either the em-
ployee–owner or the IRS sought to assert a salary that varied from the
applicable safe harbor amount, then the burden would be on the mov-
ing party to prove that such amount represents the accurate value of
the services provided subject to a rebuttable presumption that the safe
harbor is correct.
Additionally, the safe harbor method would allow for an
owner–employee that wears several different hats in the business to
accept the reasonable compensation for each such job description.  For
instance, an attorney that leaves a larger firm to work as a sole propri-
etor would spend significantly more time on many varied activities,
such as administrative assistant work, marketing, client develop-
ment, and billing, as opposed to only providing legal services full time.
That same attorney may have previously billed 2,000 hours a year to
legal services alone and spent only a negligible amount of time on
other activities, but upon going it alone, this attorney may spend 250
hours doing marketing and client development, 250 hours doing bill-
ing and accounting, and then the remaining 1,500 hours doing billable
work.  Applying a reasonable compensation standard to such a sole
proprietor attorney on an hourly basis using the different job descrip-
tions and hourly rates would accurately determine the value of all the
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services the attorney–owner provided throughout the year.  Addition-
ally, to the extent that the attorney’s marketing efforts, reputation, or
business processes allow the attorney to achieve greater than normal
returns on legal services provided—or to the extent that the attorney
expands and brings in associates and paralegals—these additional re-
turns in excess of the value of the attorney’s services would be prop-
erly attributable to the attorney’s investment in goodwill, regardless
of whether that goodwill were purchased or homegrown.155  While this
approach would provide significant opportunities for abuse under the
current lack of guidance, the implementation of safe harbors would
allow for the efficient and reliable administration of the reasonable
compensation standard.
B. To the Extent the Value of Services Provided By an
Owner–Employee Exceeds the Income from the Entity,
the Difference Should Be Carried Forward for Up to
Three Years and Applied to Other Income of the
Owner–Employee to the Extent Such Income Exceeds the
Value of Services Provided
Another problem facing the SECA tax base is the fact that start-up
companies often generate profits in later years based on services pro-
vided in earlier loss years.  A taxpayer can thereby avoid SECA taxes
by providing services during the loss years and then, upon turning a
profit, hire out the services to third parties, thereby avoiding SECA
tax obligations altogether.  These issues are not unique to this propo-
sal, and such strategies are undoubtedly used under the current re-
gime.  The remedy for this would be to simply apply a payroll tax on
the value of the services provided by the owner–employee without re-
gard to the profits of the company.  The problem with attempts to rem-
edy this issue in this manner is that some businesses simply never
turn a profit, and it would be patently unfair to impose a tax burden
on a taxpayer if the taxpayer’s services were provided to their own
business for several years but the taxpayer never actually realized
profits equal to the value of such services.  Taxpayers in this situation
would be hit with the double negative of having realized less income
than their services would have otherwise merited and being stuck
with a tax burden based on wages that may never be received.
155. This represents a shift in thinking, particularly as to the payroll tax obligations
for professionals in professional services firms, which have long been believed to
be bereft of returns on goodwill or anything besides compensation for services
provided. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 11, at 14 (“Wages subject to
federal employment taxes generally include all pay you give to an employee for
services performed.”).  The assertion that all returns to professional services
firms must be merely the sum of all of the different partners’ labor is counterfac-
tual, and professional services firms should be under the same standards as any
other business.
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In light of these competing factors, a balanced solution would be to
carry forward the value of such services—provided that the value is
not already taxed under SECA—to future years for up to three years
and apply it against other income of that entity without regard to the
taxpayer’s wage base limit.  At first glance, this carry-forward may
appear to be taxing capital and thereby violating the very policy that
was used to defeat the other methods for normalizing the SECA tax
base.  However, the theory is that the income limitation in the early
years is essentially the sum of income from the value of the
owner–employee’s services provided, presumed to be the reasonable
value of such compensation, netted against a loss from capital derived,
more or less, from negative goodwill.  So, in actuality, this carry-for-
ward is merely correcting a timing difference by replacing income
from capital with wage income subject to the SECA tax in order to
recapture losses from capital that were deducted against the tax-
payer’s SECA tax base in prior years.
Recapturing the unused amounts of reasonable compensation in
future years simply restores this balance so that reasonable compen-
sation and capital income are taxed appropriately over time by elimi-
nating timing differences manifest across a three-year window.  If the
entity consistently returns less income than the value of the
owner–employee’s services, then these lesser amounts should be
deemed the proper amount of compensation for the services provided,
and the carry-forward should expire once it falls outside the three-
year audit window.  This carry-forward strikes a careful balance be-
tween the interests of preserving the SECA tax base to the extent it
would be eroded by arbitrary timing differences and treating fairly
those business owners who consistently fail to achieve profits equal to
the value of the services they provided.  This approach could also be
used across multiple entities to divorce the payroll tax calculation
from the taxpayer’s activities in each specific business and take a
more holistic approach by considering all of the activities of the tax-
payer in determining the reasonable compensation amount, not just
the activities within specific ventures.
C. Modifying the Definition of Net Investment Income to
Correct the Loophole for S Corporations
For the reasons stated above, the exclusion of nonpassive income
from the net investment income tax base should be eliminated, which
could be accomplished by deleting section 1411(c)(2)(A) of the Internal
Revenue Code, but a simpler revision would eliminate most loopholes
applicable to the net investment income tax base if made in conjunc-
tion with the changes to SECA and FICA.  The complexity of the cur-
rent definition for net investment income is in part a result of the
unnecessary complexity of the SECA and FICA tax base definitions.
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Simplifying the SECA and FICA tax regimes based on a modified rea-
sonable compensation standard provides the opportunity to close any
of the corresponding loopholes in the net investment income tax base.
The general definition under section 1411 for what is included in net
investment income could be modified to simply include all income that
is not otherwise subject to FICA or SECA taxes and then retain the
exclusion of income subject to FICA and SECA under section
1411(b)(6).  Additional specific exclusions, such as the exclusion of in-
come from qualified plans, could then be added to this general defini-
tion as deemed appropriate.156
This is a particularly attractive approach in terms of increasing
compliance because the maximum amount excluded from either Medi-
care or net investment income tax would be set by the net investment
income tax floor.  All income above the net investment income floor
would be subject to a 3.8% rate regardless of whether it is subject to
Medicare tax or net investment income tax.  In other words, the incen-
tives for a taxpayer to enter the battlefield for payroll tax avoidance
would be substantially limited and the stakes would be substantially
reduced.
D. The Practical and Political Feasibility of This Proposal—
How to Pay for and Pass It
The case for a modified reasonable compensation standard across
all entities and taxpayers is strongly based on the original policy for
payroll taxes, but it is equally important to consider whether the im-
plementation of such legislation is practically and politically feasible.
In terms of political feasibility, conveniently, Congress is in the pre-
liminary phase of a bi-partisan effort to consider sweeping changes to
the taxation of flow-through entities on the income tax side with a
view toward simplifying and unifying S corporations and entities
taxed as partnerships.157  To the extent that these preliminary efforts
successfully result in legislation, this would be the appropriate time to
overhaul the payroll tax regime, as well.  Even though the current pro-
posals have not contemplated changes to the SECA tax regime, it
would make no sense to unify the taxation of all flow-through entities
for income-tax purposes but retain separate systems for determining
the SECA tax base of S corporations, LLCs, and LLPs.
Another consideration that would be at the forefront of any such
legislation is how this proposal would affect the federal deficit.  There
are a number of moving parts that would have varying effects on the
federal budget, and determining such effects with precision is beyond
the scope of this Article, as it would require another CBO study, but
156. See I.R.C. § 1411(c)(5) (2012).
157. See sources cited supra note 3.
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considering the various effects suggests that this proposal could po-
tentially be structured as revenue neutral.  For instance, eliminating
capital from the SECA tax base would represent a 42% reduction in
the tax base,158 which represents both a reduction in the tax base and
a reduction in participation in social security.  So, at least in theory,
the lost revenues from this change would be at least partially offset.
However, because the value of the burden imposed by social security
now exceeds the expected future benefit from the program and the
amounts going to Medicare are not linked to the benefits paid out, a
reduction in participation would likely generate a gap requiring an
additional source of funding or an additional reduction in benefits for
this change to be revenue neutral.  This proposal also provides for ad-
ditional revenues in the form of (i) the SECA tax carry-forward, which
would increase both revenues and participation in social security, as
well as revenues for Medicare and (ii) closing loopholes in the net in-
vestment tax base, which would simply expand the tax base increas-
ing Medicare revenues.  To the extent that these changes represent a
net increase in revenues for Medicare, the rate could even potentially
be reduced to retain revenue neutrality notwithstanding a broader tax
base, although such an option is unlikely given the current environ-
ment and concern over the federal deficit.
There are too many moving parts to determine the effect of these
changes to the payroll tax system and the politics for achieving pas-
sage would vary significantly depending on how these numbers play
out.159  Using this modified reasonable compensation standard offers
benefits both political parties may find sufficiently enticing to actually
achieve enactment, particularly in an environment where lawmakers
are already seeking to simplify and standardize the taxation of flow-
through entities. At a minimum, conservative lawmakers could bill
this as a payroll tax cut for small businesses functioning as tax part-
nerships that are overpaying their SECA tax liability compared to
their corporate counterparts, and both conservative and progressive
lawmakers could promote this as a bill that closes a loophole in the net
investment income tax base and makes the overall tax regime more
equitable.  This would represent a rare combination of a political win-
win that is also consistent with good policy.  To the extent that these
changes represent an increase in revenues for Medicare, then the rate
could be reduced to retain revenue neutrality.
158. See supra text accompanying note 67.
159. This author is generally of the opinion that a sound policy-based recommendation
should be made with at least some consideration for the likelihood of actual pas-
sage in order to be policy-relevant. See, e.g., John S. Treu, The Mandatory Disclo-
sure Provisions of the Uniform Trust Code: Still Boldly Going Where No
Jurisdiction Will Follow—A Practical Tax-Based Solution, 82 Miss. L.J. 597
(2013).
626 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:586
VII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Congress and the IRS should imple-
ment a modified reasonable compensation standard with specifically
articulated safe harbors and a carry-forward of untaxed compensation
to standardize the SECA tax base with the FICA base for all taxpay-
ers.  Additionally, the definition for net investment income should be
modified to include all income that is not currently included in the
FICA or SECA tax bases to clarify the law and to close the loophole
applicable to active income derived from S corporations in excess of
the value of reasonable compensation.
